Abstract-Vehicular communication plays a key role in nearfuture automotive transport, promising features like increased traffic safety or wireless software updates. However, vehicular communication can expose driver locations and thus poses important privacy risks. Many schemes have been proposed to protect privacy in vehicular communication, and their effectiveness is usually shown using privacy metrics. However, to the best of our knowledge, (1) different privacy metrics have never been compared to each other, and (2) it is unknown how strong the metrics are. In this paper, we argue that privacy metrics should be monotonic, i.e. that they indicate decreasing privacy for increasing adversary strength, and we evaluate the monotonicity of 32 privacy metrics on real and synthetic traffic with state-ofthe-art adversary models. Our results indicate that most privacy metrics are weak at least in some situations. We therefore recommend to use metrics suites, i.e. combinations of privacy metrics, when evaluating new privacy-enhancing technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION Vehicular wireless communication technologies allow ve-
hicles to communicate with other vehicles and infrastructure nodes to enable features like intersection collision avoidance or cooperative adaptive cruise control. To realize these features, vehicles transmit sensitive data -often without encryptionfor example their location, speed, and heading. This information can be used by anybody within wireless transmission range to track vehicles and their drivers on a large scale [3] . These privacy issues are well recognized, and many schemes have been proposed to protect privacy. For example, vehicles are often assumed to have pools of pseudonyms in addition to a long-term identifier, and different schemes have been proposed to change pseudonyms in a privacy-preserving way without compromising safety and accountability [9] . Privacy metrics quantify how effectively these schemes protect privacy.
Because privacy is difficult to quantify, privacy metrics focus on quantities that are related to privacy, for example the number of vehicles that an adversary cannot distinguish, or the probability that an adversary can track a vehicle successfully. Many such metrics have been proposed, and researchers usually select one or two metrics to evaluate a new scheme.
However, there is a lack of research into the metrics themselves. In particular, we are not aware of research that compares privacy metrics or analyzes how strong privacy metrics are. This is important because the accurate measurement of privacy is essential to evaluate new privacy protections.
Contributions. We make three contributions to research on privacy metrics: (1) We define monotonicity as a criterion for the strength of privacy metrics, i.e. a privacy metric should indicate low privacy for strong adversaries, and high privacy for weak adversaries. (2) We describe a method to evaluate monotonicity systematically and (3) we apply this method to study 32 privacy metrics proposed in the literature, including metrics that have not been used in vehicular privacy before.
II. RELATED WORK Privacy metrics for vehicular communications. Several privacy metrics have been used in vehicular communications, most notably the anonymity set size, entropy, the adversary's success rate, and the maximum tracking time [6] . Many more privacy metrics have been proposed in other fields [8] , but it is unclear whether they are suitable for vehicular privacy.
Evaluation of metrics. To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that compares or evaluates privacy metrics for vehicular privacy. We have previously studied privacy metrics for genomic privacy and proposed a methodology to systematically evaluate the strength of privacy metrics [7] .
III. METHODOLOGY To evaluate how good privacy metrics are, i.e. the strength of privacy metrics, we adapt the method we first introduced for genomic privacy [7] . Our method provides a controlled environment to experiment with privacy metrics by abstracting from many of the factors that affect privacy in the real world. For example, we assume that precise and timely position updates are available for all cars instead of considering networklevel packet delays or losses.
The method relies on four core components: user behavior, adversary behavior, criteria for metric strength, and privacy metrics. We implemented all four components in Python using the packages numpy, scipy, scikit-learn, and mpi4py.
A. User Behavior: Real-World Traffic Traces
We model user behavior using spatiotemporal traffic traces that determine the characteristics of the network traffic the adversary can observe. We use two sets of traffic traces, inner city traffic and highway traffic, to model realistic traffic in varied environments. For inner city traffic, we use taxi traces recorded in Rome [2] . The dataset consists of one month of measurements for 320 taxis, with one data point every 7 s. We reduced the granularity to 15 s to offset missing data points. For highway traffic, we use synthetic traffic from highways near Madrid [5] . The dataset provides traffic on three 10 km stretches of highway, with one data point every 500 ms. Because the characteristics of vehicular network graphs depend on times of day and days of the week [5] , we selected different combinations of times and days (see Table I ). 
B. Adversary Behavior
The adversary in vehicular communications is often assumed to be a passive observer who aims to track vehicles. To evaluate the strength of privacy metrics, the adversary model needs to (1) represent a realistic and strong adversary, and (2) be adjustable to model adversaries of different strengths.
Tracking algorithm. We implemented a state-of-the-art tracking algorithm, the joint probabilistic data association filter (JPDA) (also called multiple hypothesis tracker (MHT) with zero-scan [9] ). The JPDA algorithm maintains a list of tracks, each representing one vehicle. Whenever new observations arrive, the tracker computes the best continuations for all tracks, based only on positions and velocities of existing tracks and observations. JPDA uses Kalman filtering and can resolve non-unique associations between existing tracks and new observations. Our implementation of JPDA follows [1] , with inspiration for the definition of the state vector and covariance matrices taken from [4] , [9] . The tracker is subject to two kinds of noise: process noise represents random motion entering the system between observations, and measurement noise represents uncertainty in measurement. Both kinds of noise are assumed to be normally distributed white noise with covariances Q (process noise) and R (measurement noise).
Ordered strength levels. To fulfill the requirement for adjustable adversary strengths, we adjusted the parameters for the JPDA tracker. Because tracker performance strongly depends on the values for the covariance matrices R and Q [9] , we chose nine parameter levels for each r and q, with r = [1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 80, 100, 140] and q = 0.1r. Fig. 1 shows that these parameter levels result in ordered levels of adversary strength, with 1 consistently the strongest adversary level and 140 the weakest.
C. Criteria for Metric Strength
To determine how strong a privacy metric is, we use the criterion of monotonicity: with increasing adversary strength, metrics should indicate decreasing privacy values. We have previously proposed an algorithm to compute monotonicity scores [7] . In brief, the algorithm uses two statistical tests for each pair of successive adversary strength levels to determine whether the difference between mean metric values is statistically significant and points in the expected direction (positive for higher-better metrics, negative for lower-better metrics). Each outcome of each statistical test is then assigned points: +1 for a difference in the expected direction, −1 for Probability that a vehicle's track is continued with the correct observation, by adversary strength level. a difference in the wrong direction, and −2 for a change in direction (a peak means that strong and weak adversaries cannot be distinguished and is thus not desirable). The total monotonicity score is the addition of these point values.
IV. RESULTS
We applied the JPDA tracker to all eight data slices and evaluated each of the privacy metrics in all time steps. We first present detailed results for some metrics (Section IV-A), and briefly discuss the full results in Section IV-B. For equations and references for each metric, we refer to [8] . The figures show the distribution of results using violin plots and indicate confidence intervals (horizontal lines), area between quartiles (shaded), mean values (bold numbers), and whether higher or lower numbers indicate higher privacy (green line).
A. Detailed Results
Uncertainty Metrics. The anonymity set size indicates how many vehicles the adversary cannot distinguish, i.e. the number of vehicles to which the tracker assigns a non-zero probability. The anonymity set size in Madrid (highway) is much lower than in Rome (inner-city taxis), despite lower traffic density in Rome (Fig. 2) . This may be due to designated waiting areas for taxis, and indicates that the anonymity set size is sensitive to differences in traffic characteristics. Entropy indicates the adversary's uncertainty as to which member of the anonymity set is the true target. Entropy is monotonic, but much lower in Madrid than in Rome (Fig.  3) . This shows that the absolute value of entropy is not easily comparable across scenarios because it is influenced by the size of the anonymity set. (see Fig. 10 ). Cumulative entropy assumes that subsequent independent applications of privacy mechanisms (e.g., mix zones) increase the privacy of vehicles and thus adds up the entropies from each application. The values depend on how often privacy mechanisms are applied. User-centric location privacy assumes that entropy decays over time with a userspecified rate l until refreshed by a privacy mechanism. We assume a refresh whenever a vehicle's anonymity set size is greater than 1. However, the metric is almost always zero and thus cannot distinguish strong and weak adversaries.
Information Gain/Loss Metrics. The amount of leaked information indicates how many vehicles the adversary could track correctly. However, weaker adversaries in Rome track more vehicles than strong adversaries. In addition, the values depend strongly on the total number of vehicles. Relative entropy measures the distance between between the adversary's estimated probabilities and the ground truth. However, the metric shows decreasing instead of increasing values in Rome. Mutual information indicates the amount of information that is shared between the distribution of the adversary's estimate and the ground truth. Mutual information is monotonic (Fig. 4) , but not all adversary strengths in Rome can be distinguished. Loss of anonymity describes how much information can be learned from the adversary's estimate (in terms of mutual information) for the least private distribution of true outcomes. This always gives the maximum mutual information and thus does not allow to distinguish adversary strengths. Information surprisal describes how much information is contained in the adversary's estimate of the true outcome, indicating how surprised the adversary would be upon learning the true outcome. However, the metric shows increasing instead of decreasing values for Madrid. Increase in adversary's belief measures the difference between the adversary's estimates in the current and previous time step. Because these differences are both positive and negative, the metric does not seem suitable to indicate privacy against a tracking adversary. Pearson's correlation coefficient measures the degree of linear dependence between the adversary's estimate and the ground truth, with a lower coefficient indicating higher privacy. The correlation values are monotonic, but with low values throughout.
Adversary's Success Probability Metrics. The adversary's success rate indicates the percentage of vehicles that were tracked correctly. The success rate (Fig. 5) is monotonic in both scenarios and, unlike most other metrics, indicates zero privacy for the five strongest adversaries in Madrid. User-specified innocence indicates the number of vehicles for which the adversary's probability for the true outcome is below a user-specified threshold t, indicating how many vehicles are unlikely to be tracked. The metric is monotonic (Fig. 6 ), but the values depend on the number of vehicles. The hiding property behaves similarly, but indicates the number of vehicles for which the adversary's best probability is below a threshold t, i.e. the number of vehicles for which the adversary is uncertain of how to continue their tracks. The privacy breach level indicates the probability the adversary assigns to the true vehicle, and is monotonic in both scenarios.
Error Metrics. The expected estimation error (Fig. 7 ) measures the expected Euclidean distance between the adversary's estimated location and the true location. The metric is monotonic in both scenarios. The smaller error in Madrid is likely caused by more regular traffic patterns on a highway. Incorrectness replaces the Euclidean distance with a distance that indicates 0 for the correct guess and 1 otherwise. That is, incorrectness indicates the adversary's probability of error and thus mirrors the results for the adversary's success rate. The mean squared error indicates the error between the adversary's estimated distribution and the true outcome. However, the error values are almost indistinguishable in both scenarios, and the metric indicates smaller errors for weaker adversaries in Rome. Percentage incorrectly classified (Fig. 8) indicates the percentage of vehicles that were not tracked correctly. This is a normalized and inverted version of the amount of information leaked. Normalization makes this metric more accurate so that weaker adversaries correctly show a higher percentage of incorrect classifications. This time is very small because the anonymity set size is rarely 1. Against an adversary who can track successfully even with larger anonymity sets, this metric does not provide a useful indication of privacy. Time to confusion (Fig. 9) indicates the cumulative time during which entropy is below a threshold h, i.e. the time during which the adversary is not confused. As expected, weaker adversaries have a shorter time to confusion. Time to first confusion gives the first time when entropy drops Influence of parameter settings. We evaluated how parameter settings influence the strength of the parameterized metrics. Fig. 10 shows that time/distance to confusion are stronger if the threshold is small (e.g., h = 0.1), whereas the strength of time/distance to first confusion and user-centric location privacy does not depend on the choice of threshold. Hiding property and user-specified innocence are stronger if the threshold is large (e.g., t = 0.9).
Influence of traffic conditions. Fig. 10 shows that the strength of most metrics fluctuates between scenarios and traffic conditions (for example, time/distance to confusion, mean squared error, relative entropy). If these metrics are selected to evaluate a new privacy protection technology, it is necessary to validate their strength for the specific scenario.
Metrics suites. To offset weaknesses in metrics, several metrics can be combined in a metrics suite that includes strong metrics from each of Sections IV-A to IV-A and metrics that are good for between-scenario comparisons. An example metrics suite could thus consist of normalized entropy, mutual information, normalized variance, the adversary's success rate, the expected estimation error, and the time to confusion.
V. CONCLUSION
We have evaluated the strength of 32 privacy metrics for vehicular communications privacy in terms of their monotonicity and comparability between traffic conditions. We found that only few metrics are strong across all conditions, while most metrics are weak at least in some conditions. It is not immediately clear what causes these weaknesses. When selecting privacy metrics to evaluate new privacy protection technologies, we therefore recommend to: (1) evaluate the strength of the selected privacy metrics in each specific scenario before committing to their usage, and (2) always use metrics suites, i.e. to combine several strong metrics from different categories.
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